Abstract. We provide new security proofs for PMAC, TMAC, and XCBC message authentication modes. The previous security bounds for these modes were σ 2 /2 n , where n is the block size in bits and σ is the total number of queried message blocks. Our new bounds are q 2 /2 n for PMAC and q 2 /2 n + 4 q 2 /2 2n for TMAC and XCBC, where q is the number of queries and is the maximum message length in n-bit blocks. This improves the previous results under most practical cases, e.g., when no message is exceptionally long compared to other messages.
Introduction
Message authentication code (MAC) is a symmetric-keyed function used for ensuring the authenticity of messages. Many studies have been done on MACs built using blockciphers (i.e., MAC modes of operation) including the CBC-MAC and its variants. The theoretical security of stateless (i.e., no counter or nonce is used) MAC mode F [E K ] using blockcipher E K can be measured using the maximum advantage of an adversary trying to distinguish F [E K ] from the random oracle, which provides an independent and uniform output for any distinct input, using a chosen-plaintext attack (CPA). Typically, the key task in proving the maximum advantage is to prove the maximum information-theoretic (IT) advantage for the target MAC, where the adversary has infinite computational power and the MAC is built using the uniform random permutation (URP), which is the ideal functionality of a blockcipher. Improving the maximum IT-advantage is important, because it will contribute to better understanding of the target function and to expanding the scope of application.
Bellare, Pietrzak, and Rogaway [5] analyzed the IT-advantage for the CBC-MAC and the encrypted CBC-MAC called EMAC [2] . Neglecting constants, the previous EMAC bound using the n-bit URP was 2 q 2 /2 n [7] for any (q, )-CPA, which uses q chosen messages with lengths less than n bits. Bellare et al. investigated whether this could be improved, particularly with respect to . They proved the improved bound d( )q 2 /2 n + 4 q 2 /2 2n , where d( ) is a function that grows very slowly with (see Sect. 4). A similar result was obtained for CBC-MAC for prefix-free messages. Recently, Pietrzak [18] proved EMAC bound q 2 /2 n for a range of (q, ) (in fact, the result was q 2 /2 n + 8 q 2 /2 2n for any q ≥ 2 ). Given these findings, it is quite natural to ask if similar improvements can be obtained for modes other than EMAC, especially more sophisticated ones.
EMAC uses two blockcipher keys, and only messages with a length multiple of n are supported. In this paper, we describe several MAC modes and provide new security bounds for them. Our first target is PMAC, which was proposed by Black and Rogaway [7] and Rogaway [19] . It is a one-key MAC; i.e., the MAC function uses one blockcipher key, and messages of any lengths are supported, and is fully parallelizable. The original security bound was σ 2 /2 n [7, 19] , where σ is the total number of queried message blocks, which immediately implies 2 q 2 /2 n for any (q, )-CPA, as σ ≤ q holds. Here, we demonstrate a new bound q 2 /2 n by taking an approach different from that of the previous proof. We also provide new bounds for two successors of EMAC called TMAC [13] and XCBC [7] . Like EMAC, they are based on CBC-MAC. However, they do not use two blockcipher keys, and can efficiently handle messages of arbitrary length. Our bounds are obtained by combining our PMAC proof technique and the CBC-MAC collision analysis provided by Bellare et al. [5] . For TMAC and XCBC, the previous bounds are σ 2 /2 n shown by Iwata and Kurosawa [10] , and our bound is q 2 /2 n + 4 q 2 /2 2n . We also investigated OMAC [11] (i.e., CMAC [1] ), which is an optimized version of TMAC and XCBC. Although some part of TMAC proof can also be applied to OMAC, we could not obtain a new bound at this moment. The analysis of OMAC is briefly described in Sect. 5 .
We have to emphasize that our results are not always better than the previous ones. Since all of our targets have σ 2 /2 n bounds, ours are worse if message length distribution is heavily biased to the left, e.g., one -block message and (q − 1) one-block messages. For other cases, ours are better. A detailed comparison is given in Sect. 5.
Preliminaries
Notation. {0, 1} and {0, 1} n are denoted by Σ and Σ n . The set of i-bit sequences for all i = 1, . . . , n is denoted by Σ
≤m is the set of binary sequences with lengths that are a multiple of n and at most nm. Σ * is the set of all finite-length bit sequences. The bit length of x is denoted by |x|.
The n-bit uniform random permutation (URP), denoted by P n , is a random permutation with a uniform distribution over all permutations on Σ n . The random oracle (RO), which has n-bit output and is denoted by O n , is a random function that accepts any x ∈ Σ * and outputs independent and uniformly random n-bit values for any distinct inputs. For any two colliding inputs, RO outputs the same value. Field with 2 n points. We consider the elements of field GF(2 n ) as n-bit coefficient vectors of the polynomials in the field. We represent n-bit coefficient vectors by integers 0, 1, . . . , 2 n − 1, e.g., 2 corresponds to coefficient vector (00 . . . 010), which corresponds to x in the polynomial representation, and 3 denotes (00 . . . 011), which corresponds to x + 1. For any x, y ∈ Σ n , xy denotes the field multiplication of two elements represented by x and y. For simplicity, we assume n = 128 throughout the paper.
Security notions. We used the standard security notion for symmetric cryptography [3, 4, 9] . The Goal of Our Analysis. In this paper, we consider only the informationtheoretic security, where the adversary has infinite computational power (thus θ contains no computational restrictions), and the target is realized by the ideal n-bit blockcipher, i.e., P n . In many cases, including ours, once the informationtheoretic security is proved, the computational counterpart, where the adversary is computationally restricted and a real blockcipher is used, is quite easy.
Our target modes are stateless and variable-input-length (VIL) functions with n-bit output (VIL means that the domain is Σ * ). Therefore, for mode
vilqrf denotes a VIL quasi-random function [15] that cannot be informationtheoretically distinguished from RO without a negligibly small success probability. If Adv vilqrf F [Pn] (θ) is small, the maximum success probability of a MAC forgery for all θ-CPAs against F [P n ] is also small (e.g., see Proposition 2.7 of [3] ). In this paper, θ contains one of two additional parameters in addition to the number of queries, q: the total number of n-bit blocks for allueries, σ, and the maximum length of a query (in n-bit blocks), . We focus on the θ = (q, ) case.
PMAC

Description and Previous Security Proof
PMAC has two versions; we focus on the later version [12, 19] . We call it simply "PMAC". The main idea of PMAC is as follows. [19] ) Assume that the representation of GF(2 n ) (n = 128) is based on the lexicographically first primitive polynomial (see [19] for details). Let I = {1, .., 2 n/2 } and J = {0, 1, 2} be the set of integers used as indices Multiplication of a constant and a variable is generally much simpler than multiplication of variables. For example, multiplication with 2 (i.e., a doubling operation) requires a bit shift followed by a conditional xor. Therefore, computation of 2 α 3 β from 2 α−1 3 β or 2 α 3 β−1 is significantly faster than one blockcipher invocation. The idea of PMAC [19] , called the "powering-up construction", is to use 2 α 3 β as a masking value for every blockcipher input, incrementing α or β. For blockcipher E K , PMAC is defined as follows. We say "partition x ∈ Σ * into (x [1] , . . . , x [m] )" to set m = x n def = max{ |x|/n , 1} and x = (x [1] , . . . , x [m] ) with
Lemma 1. (Proposition 5 of
, where 0 corresponds to the all-zero n-bit sequence, in the preprocessing. Then, for input
, and if m = 1, Psum = 0. Here, I(x) = 1 if |x| is a multiple of n and I(x) = 2 otherwise, and pad(
* otherwise, where
* is a concatenation of x [m] and the (n − |x [m] |)-bit sequence (100 . . . 0). Rogaway [19] proved the security of PMAC, which is as follows. [19] ) Let PMAC[P n ] be the PMAC using P n (see the left of Fig. 1 Corollary 17 of [19] only proved the first claim. The second follows from the first and σ ≤ q.
Theorem 1. (Corollary 17 of
New Security Bound for PMAC
Our security bound of PMAC is the following. The proof will be provided later.
Theorem 2. Let PMAC[P n ] be the PMAC using P n . We then have
From this theorem, we have Adv
Notation for Proof. Since we use Maurer's methodology 4 (e.g., see [15] ) to make our proofs intuitive and simple, we briefly describe his notation. For completeness, part of his results that we used for our proof is cited in Appendix A. Consider event a i defined for i input/output pairs, and possibly some internal variables, of random function F . Let a i be the negation of a i . We assume a i is monotone; i.e., a i never occurs if a i−1 occurs. For instance, a i is monotone if it indicates that all i outputs are distinct. An infinite sequence of monotone events, A = a 0 a 1 . . . , is called a monotone event sequence (MES) [15] . Here, a 0 denotes some tautological event. Note that Let MESs A and B be defined for two random functions, F and G, respectively. Let X i and Y i be the i-th input and output. Let P F be the probability space defined by F . For example, P
the maximum probability of a q for any θ-CPA that interacts with F . Similarly, µ θ (F, a q ) denotes the maximum probability of a q for any non-adaptive θ-CPA. For θ = (q, ), they are abbreviated to ν (F, a q ) and µ (F, a q ). If θ = q, the subscript is omitted, e.g., we write ν(F, a q ).
Here, µ θ (F, a q ) can be rewritten as max
, where the maximum is taken for all (non-adaptively chosen)
Analysis of PHASH. Proving Theorem 2 requires an analysis of the messagehashing part of PMAC[P n ], which we call PHASH. For
, and (1)
Proof. We only prove Eq. (1) as Eq. (2) can be similarly proved. Fix x and x . Let
where U coll is the set of all trivial collisions, e.g., U 1 and U 1+m when x [1] = x [1] . Note that U can not be the empty set as x = x . For simplicity, we assume no trivial collision (thus U = {U 1 , . . . , U m+m }), however the following analysis works even if some trivial collisions exist. For
Here, the sum of all equivalent sets is a decomposition of U. Whether U sub is an equivalent set or not depends on the value of L. If k is odd (even), we say U sub is an odd (even) equivalent set. Let odd k be the event such that there are k odd equivalent sets having non-zero values (the value of an equivalent set is the value of its members). We have
where
is either the sum of k URP outputs for k non-zero distinct inputs or the sum of c and k URP outputs for k non-zero distinct inputs (note that odd k does not exclude an odd equivalent set with value 0). Then, the property of P n shows that, for any non-zero distinct k inputs,
holds, where the inequality holds since c k is uniquely determined (or does not exist) if c 1 , . . . , c k−1 are fixed. From Eqs. (3) and (4), we obtain
Next, we analyze Pr[odd 0 ]. We have
where the first inequality holds since if U 1 is unique (i.e., U 1 is in an odd equivalent set) and odd 0 holds, U 1 must be 0. The second holds since both U 1 and U 1 ⊕ U j for any j = 1 are permutations of L from Lemma 1. From Eqs. (5) and (6), we obtain
This concludes the proof of Lemma 2.
Proof of Theorem 2. First, we introduce the tweakable [14] n-bit URP, P n . It has tweak space T = I × J , where I = {1, . . . , 2 n/2 } and J = {1, 2}. It consists of |T | independent n-bit URPs; P n (t, x) is the output of an n-bit URP indexed by t ∈ T and having input x ∈ Σ n . Using P n and P n , independent of P n , we define the modified PMAC (MPMAC) as follows. First, compute L = P n (0).
Note that a tweak is a function of x. Proof Idea. Since the advantage is the absolute difference between two probabilities, we can use a triangle inequality, Adv
H,On (θ) for any VIL function H, and for any θ. Here, H is an intermediate function. Theorem 1 was derived using "PMAC with an ideal tweakable blockcipher", which invokes an independent URP for each message block in the message-hashing part as well as in the finalization, as the intermediate function. Here, our proof uses MPMAC as the intermediate function.
We start by proving the advantage between PMAC[P n ] and MPMAC, which requires defining some random variables. Let X i ∈ Σ * be the i-th query of the adversary. If m = X i n , we write X i = (X i [1] , . . . , X i[m] ). Note that X i is a random variable, and its distribution is determined by the adversary and the target MAC. Fixed queries (and other random variables) are written in lower case, e.g.,
) be the set of inputs (outputs) to P n generated in the PHASH for allueries. We do not include the result of preprocessing, i.e., L = P n (0), in M (q) and C (q) . We also define Y i ∈ Σ n as the i-th tag, and Y
when the i-th query has m blocks. Also, S i is defined as a dummy variable in MPMAC. See Fig. 1 for reference.
Proof. (of Lemma 3) The first and second inequalities are derived from Maurer's methodology. See Appendix B for the proof. In the following, we prove the third. Analysis for ν (MPMAC, a q ∧ b q ). We use the following lemma. The proof is in Appendix C.
where the maximums are taken for all X q = x q with |x i | ≤ n for all i.
. Let M i denote the input set to P n that occur in the i-th PHASH call, except the all-zero input used to obtain L. Note that
Using the union bound and its variant, we have
Now we analyze each term in Eq. (8) . For this analysis, for some i = j, we fix the i-th and j-th queries to x i = (x i [1] , . . . , x i [m] ) and x j = (x j [1] , . . . , x j[m ] ) with x i = x j . We start with the first term. Collision S i = S j is equivalent to
To prove the maximum probability of Eq. (9), we need to use a case analysis. Case 1: m = m = 1. In this case,
is a permutation of L from Lemma 1. Thus, the probability of Eq. (9) is 1/2 n . If I(x i ) = I(x j ), the probability is zero as pad(x i ) = pad(x j ). Case 2: m > 1, m = 1. In this case, the probability of Eq. (9) is obviously at
) from the second claim of Lemma 2.
Case 3: m = m > 1. If the first m − 1 blocks of x i and x j are the same, the probability is at most 1/2 n , which is the same as in Case 1. Otherwise, Eq. (9) occurs with a probability of at most (2 − 2)/2 n + 1/(2 n − (2 − 2)) from the first claim of Lemma 2.
Case 4: m > 1, m > 1, m = m . The bound of Case 3 also holds true. Thus, we have max
.
For the second term, observe that χ 2,i is the logical sum of events such that
h . Thus, it is enough to evaluate the maximum of Pr
We fix u 1 = 0 and u 2 , and let
where the sum and maximums are taken for all c = u 3 that satisfies χ 4,i , and 
holds for any 1 ≤ i ≤ q, where the inequality holds since M (q) contains at most ( − 1)q distinct elements. For the third and fourth terms of Eq. (8), we have
, and max
where the first inequality follows from the same analysis as for the second term, and the second inequality holds since χ 4,i occurs if L takes one of (at most) − 1 values defined by x i . Combining Eqs. (10), (13) , and (14), we get
Note that a q implies V i = V j if i-th and j-th tweaks are the same, for all 1 ≤ i < j ≤ q. Therefore, if a q is given, the collision probability between Y i and Y j is at most 1/2 n for all fixedueries. Thus we have
Analysis for ν (MPMAC, d q ∧ e q ). We consider a tweakable function, G, having n-bit input and output and tweak space T = I×J, where I = {1, .., 2 n/2 } and J = {0, 1, 2}. For any input x ∈ Σ n and tweak t = (t [1] , t [2] ) ∈ T , it is defined as [1] , t [2] ), x), where P n and P n are independent. If we allow an adversary against G to make ( − 1)q queries for P n andueries for P n (the order of query is arbitrary), he can simulate any (q, )-CPA against MPMAC. Here, we assume that L = P n (0) is publicly available, so thatueries are enough to simulate an attack. Moreover, if a Gbased simulation generates distinct q outputs of G, this implies the occurrence of d q in MPMAC 5 . From these observations, ν (MPMAC, d q ) is at most
where Y ( q) is the set of q outputs, and q means that the adversary can make ( − 1)q queries for P n andueries for P n , and the equality follows from an analysis similar to the one used for the proof of Lemma 4. The last inequality is trivial. Similarly, we can prove ν (MPMAC, e q ) ≤ q/2 n using G. Thus we have
using Lemma 9. Combining Eqs. (15), (16) , and (17) and Lemma 4, Lemma 3 is proved.
Proving Theorem 2. Deriving an upper bound of Adv
vilqrf MPMAC (q, ) is easy since MPMAC can be seen as an instance of the Carter-Wegman MAC [20] (CW-MAC). Since the following lemma is almost the same as previous CW-MAC lemmas (e.g., Lemma 4 of [5] ), we omit the proof here.
n , where dp(m) denotes 
where the last inequality holds since q, ≥ 1. This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
TMAC and XCBC
New Security Bounds for TMAC and XCBC
Since CBC-MAC provides no security if two messages with the same prefix are processed, a number of modifications have been proposed to make CBC-MAC secure for any message. EMAC, an early attempt, uses two blockcipher keys; TMAC [13] and XCBC [7] were later proposed as better solutions: they use one blockcipher key and some additional keys, and thus avoid two blockcipher key schedulings. TMAC and XCBC are defined as follows. Let CBC be the CBC-MAC function using P n ; that is, for input
) and C 0 = 0. Let TMAC[P n ] denote the TMAC using P n . For input x ∈ Σ * , TMAC[P n ] works as follows. First, we partition x into x = (x [1] , . . . , x [m] ), where m = x n . If m > 1, the tag for
) and L is independent and uniform over Σ n . If m = 1, Y is P n (pad(x) ⊕ 2 I(x)−1 L). Note that the P n used in CBC and the one used in the finalization are identical. Therefore, in practice, TMAC has one blockcipher key and an additional n-bit key L. XCBC is similar to TMAC, but uses two n-bit keys, L 1 and L 2 , as masking values instead of L and 2L. The previous bound of TMAC [P n ] is (3 2 + 1)q 2 /2 n [13] against (q, )-CPA, and 3σ 2 /2 n against (q, σ)-CPA [10] . Almost the same results are obtained for XCBC [10, 13] . However, using our proof approach in Sect. 3 and Bellare et al.'s analysis of the CBC function [5] , we obtain the following.
Theorem 3. Let TMAC[P n ] be the TMAC using P n . We then have
The proof of Theorem 3 is in the next section. The bound of Theorem 3 is also applicable to XCBC. The proof for XCBC is the same as the proof of Theorem 3, thus we omit it here.
Proof of Theorem 3
Since the proof structure is the same as that of Theorem 2, we give only a sketch of the proof. We define a modified TMAC, denoted by MTMAC, that uses an independent tweakable URP for its finalization. In MTMAC, we partition message x into (x [1] , . . . , x [m] ), where m = x n , and when m > 1, the tag is
, where I(x) ∈ {1, 2} is a tweak. When m = 1, Y = P n (I(x), pad(x)). For both TMAC[P n ] and MTMAC, let X i ∈ Σ * be the i-th query and M (q) (C (q) ) be the set of inputs (outputs) to P n generated in the CBC function for allueries. We also define Y i as the i-th tag, and Y 
We then obtain
for any (q, ) using an argument similar to that used for Lemma 3. Note that a q does not contain [0 ∈ M (q) ∪ S (q) ], as we do not have to care about 0 being an input to P n . Since Lemma 4 does not depend on the structure of message-hashing part, it also applies to MTMAC and we have
(21) To obtain bounds of last two terms of Eq. (21), we need the following lemma 6 . It generalizes a lemma of Bellare et al. [5] . 
Proof. (of Lemma 6) For any
. From Lemma 5 of [5] , we see that the collision probability of CBC(x z) and CBC(x (z ⊕ u)) is at most 2d(m * )/2 n + 64(m * ) 4 /2 2n for any z (note that x z = x (z ⊕ u) holds for any z and u as we assumed x = x ). Therefore, the first claim is proved. The second can be similarly proved.
We analyze max X q P MTMAC aq|X q
. If the i-th and j-th queries are fixed to x i and x j
, the collision occurs with probability 1/2 n since L is independent of V i and V j and 2
which has a probability of at most 2d( )/2 n +64 4 /2 2n from Lemma 6 and a case analysis similar to the one used to derive Eq. (10) . Therefore, the probability of dist(S (q) ) is at most
n since L is independent of all members of M (q) . From these observations, we have
The analyses of max X q P MTMAC bq|aqX q and ν (MTMAC, d q ) are the same as those used for the proof of Lemma 3. We obtain
As with MPMAC, MTMAC is an instance of CW-MAC. Thus, we have
Combining the bound of Adv 
Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we have provided new security bounds for PMAC, TMAC, and XCBC. Our result demonstrates that the security degradation with respect to the maximum length of a message is linear for PMAC and almost linear (unless message is impractically long) for TMAC and XCBC, while previous analyses of these modes proved quadratic security degradation. A Comparison of Bounds. As we mentioned, our new bounds improve the old ones under most (but not all) cases. Here, we give a detailed comparison between new and old bounds. For simplicity, we ignore the constants. Thus, the new PMAC bound is q 2 /2 n , the new TMAC (and XCBC) bound is q 2 /2 n + 4 q 2 /2 2n , and the old bounds are σ 2 /2 n for all. For PMAC, the new bound is better if and only if √ q < σ, i.e., the mean message block length (σ/q) is larger than √ . Similarly, for TMAC and XCBC, the new bound is better if and only if the mean message block length is larger than (1 + c) , where c = 3 /2 n , which can be small in practice. Thus, the criterion for choosing a bound is the distance between the mean block length and the square root of the maximum block length.
As a concrete example, let n = 128, q = 2 40 , and = 2 16 . . Generally, the new bounds are better when only a tiny fraction of the message length distribution is concentrated on the right. On The Security of OMAC. OMAC [11] , i.e., CMAC [1] , is similar to TMAC, but uses a different finalization. In OMAC using P n , denoted by OMAC[P n ], L is P n (0), and, instead of using 2 
However, to obtain a bound of ν (MOMAC, a q ∧ b q ), we need the maximum probability of
2 ), which corresponds to the sum of two distinct masking values, and for all u 2 , i.e., we need a generalization of Lemma 6. We think that this is an interesting open problem.
A Lemmas from Maurer's Methodology
We describe some lemmas developed by Maurer (e.g., [15] ) that we used. We assume that F and G are two random functions with the same input/output size; we define MESs A = a 0 a 1 . . . and B = b 0 b 1 . . . for F and G. The i-th input and output are denoted by X i and Y i for F (or G), respectively. Equality of (possibly conditional) probability distributions means equality as functions, i.e., equality holds for all possible arguments. For example, we write P
, are similarly defined.
Lemma 7.
(A corollary from Theorem 1 (i), Lemma 1 (iv), and Lemma 4 (ii) of [15] 
Here, MES
These lemmas are easily extended even if the adversary's parameter θ contains (or σ) in addition to q.
B Proof of The First and Second Inequalities of Lemma 3
We define two tweakable functions having n-bit input/output and tweak space T = {1, .., 2 n/2 } × {0, 1, 2}. For any input x ∈ Σ n and tweak t = (t [1] , t [2] ) ∈ T ,
, where L = P n (0), and
P n ((t [1] , t [2] ), x), otherwise.
In the definition of XE, P n and P n are assumed to be independent. It is obvious that PMAC[P n ] and MPMAC can be realized by using XE and XE in a black-box manner. We consider a game in which an adversary tries to distinguish XE from XE usingueries. Note that a query is in T × Σ n . Let (T i , X i ) ∈ T × Σ n be the i-th query, and Y i ∈ Σ n be the i-th output. In addition, let S i be X i ⊕2 [2] L, where T i = (T i [1] , T i [2] ). For XE, S i is defined as a dummy variable when T i [2] = 0. We define the following two events:
where ψ(i)
∈ {1, 2}}, and 
where the summation is taken for all L ∈ Γ (x i , t i , y i−1 ), which is the set of L = c such that the rightmost term is non-zero. The equality of Eq. (25) holds since S i is completely determined if X i and L are fixed. We focus on the rightmost two terms of Eq. (25) for some fixed Similarly, for XE, we have
where the summation is taken for all L ∈ Γ (x i , t i , y i−1 ). Then, a simple case analysis shows that
Moreover, we have
, and (28) 
From Eqs. (27) and (30) and the second claim of Lemma 7, the first inequality of Lemma 3 is proved. The second follows from the first and Lemma 9.
C Proof of Lemma 4
Note that M (i) (C (i) ) denotes the set of P n inputs (outputs) generated in PHASH up to the i-th query. Let Z (i) be the set of random variables (L,
and X i are fixed, M (i) , V i , and S i are uniquely determined. We have
where the summations are taken for all Z (i) = z 
where the summations are taken for all y i−1 satisfying b i−1 . From this and Lemma 8, we prove the first claim of Lemma 4. The second follows from the first and the union bound.
